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The Volcker Rule's Unintended Consequences
I. INTRODUCION
In January of 2008, the French bank Soci6t6 G6n6rale
announced that one mid-level trader lost the bank $7.2 billion.
The losses incurred by the bank were the largest trading losses in
banking history. The activities of the trader greatly disturbed the
financial markets, and as a result, it led in large part to the Federal
Reserve making a historical rate cut of three-quarters of a
percentage point to the discount rate.' Although the trades were
unauthorized by the bank,4 the employee's trading activities are
considered proprietary trading.! One way to characterize
proprietary trading is trading activities that are for the bank's own
account and "unrelated to customer trading."6
1. Nicola Clark & David Jolly, French Bank Says Rogue Trader Lost $7 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, at Al; Julie Satow, How a Rogue Trader in France May
Have Moved the Fed, THE N.Y. SUN, Jan. 25, 2008,
http://www.nysun.com/business/how-a-rogue-trader-in-france-may-have-
moved/70136 (stating that Monday's "sell-off' of stocks was exacerbated by Soci6t6
G6n6rales decision to unwind the large positions taken by Paul Kievel, the rogue
trader, in the derivatives market that amounted to as much as $74 billion, leading to a
historic rate-cut by the Fed).
2. Gregory Viscusi & Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Socidtd Gdndrale Reports EU4.9
Billion Trading Loss, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2008),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=a8GBEB7UuuXc&pid=newsarchive.
3. Clark & Jolly, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. See Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank
Holding Companies: Hearing Before the S. Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs
Comm., 111th Cong. 19-20 (LEXIS) (2010) [hereinafter Prohibiting] (statement of
Paul Volcker, Chairman of the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board and
Former Federal Reserve Chairman) (stating that a single rogue trader in France cost
a bank hundreds of millions of dollars when addressing proprietary trading losses in
banks).
6. Id. at 10 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of the President's Economic
Recovery Advisory Board and Former Federal Reserve Chairman) (stating that the
legislative intent of the Rule should be clear: the Rule prohibits banks from trading
for their own account when it is unrelated to serving customers); see also Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 619, §
13(h)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1630 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851)
("'[P]roprietary trading' . . . means engaging as a principal for the trading account of
the banking entity . . . in any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or
dispose of, any security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for future
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Even though proprietary trading was not the primary cause
of the financial crisis, proponents of the Volcker Rule (Rule)
nonetheless argue that restricting such activities is an essential
piece of financial reform.8 The Rule bans "banking entit[ies]"9
from engaging in proprietary trading."o Additionally, the Rule
prohibits a banking entity from investing in or sponsoring a hedge
or private equity fund because such funds can be "alternate
vehicle[s] for . . . conducting proprietary trading operations." 2
However, a banking entity is able to make certain investments in
hedge and private equity funds such as a de minimis investment of
up to three percent of its "Tier 1 capital." According to Paul
delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any other
security or financial instrument that the appropriate .. .agencies ... determine.").
7. See Kim Dixon & Karey Wutkowski, Volcker: Proprietary Trading Not
Central to Crisis, REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Economy20l0/idUSTRE62T56420100330
(stating that Paul Volcker said that proprietary trading was not central to the
financial crisis-"the very argument used by some critics of the proposal"). But see
Stephen Gandel, Is Proprietary Trading too Wild for Wall Street?, TIME, Feb. 5, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1960565,00.html#ixzzOyPtYKOmB
(stating that many large financial institutions that failed took large positions in
proprietary trading and hedge funds and thus were a key driving force behind the
financial crisis).
8. See Gerald Epstein et al., The Real Price of Proprietary Trading,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gerald-
epsteinithe-real-price-of-proprie_b_472857.html.
9. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(h)(1) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851)
("The term 'banking entity' means any insured depository institution (as defined in
section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813)), any company that
controls an insured depository institution, or that is treated as a bank holding
company for purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, and any
affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity.").
10. The Rule also regulates nonbank financial companies governed by the Board,
but this paper only focuses on banking entities. Instead of restricting proprietary
trading and hedge and private equity fund activities, nonbank financial companies
are subject to additional capital and quantitative limits with regard to these activities.
However, the permitted activities are not subject to these requirements and limits.
Id. sec. 619, § 13(a).
11. Id. But see id. sec. 619, §§ 13(d)(1)(G), 13(d)(4) (allowing additional
exceptions to the general rule if the banking entity meets a number of requirements
that are discussed more comprehensively below).
12. Prohibiting, supra note 5, at 24 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of the
President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board and Former Federal Reserve
Chairman).
13. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(d)(4) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851);
Client Alert, Donald G. Kilpatrick et al., Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw LLP, Dodd-Frank
Act: The Volcker Rule (July 21, 2010),
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/A4D5FOB7D3743OE5BA1E4DC
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Volcker, the "plain intent" of the Rule is to reduce systemic risk to
banking entities and the U.S. financial system by limiting high-risk
trading activities in institutions that receive government support
and protection.14  Many opponents of the Rule, however, believe
that the Rule does not sufficiently address this goal and could
adversely affect the safety and soundness of banking entities."
What some have championed as legislation that reduces
systemic risk and addresses the problem of too-big-to-fail may
result in many undesirable and unintended consequences, while
doing little to address the primary goal of the Rule.16 Critics of the
Rule believe that it imposes substantial costs on the U.S. financial
system and any benefits to financial stability attendant to the Rule
are likely to be "illusory."" Now, "a small army of regulators" will
ACD68824C.pdf ("'Tier 1 capital' is the core measure of a firm's financial strength
from a regulatory perspective; it is composed of core capital, which consists primarily
of common stock and disclosed reserves or retained earnings and may also include
non-redeemable, non-cumulative preferred stock.").
14. Letter from Paul A. Volcker to Timothy Geithner, Chairman, Fin. Stability
Oversight Council (Oct. 29, 2010) (on file at www.regulations.gov) [hereinafter
Letter from Paul A. Volcker]; see also Dixon & Wutkowski, supra note 7 (stating that
proponents of the Rule believe that allowing banking entities to engage in
proprietary trading and hedge and private equity fund activities will "distract [them]
from serving clients").
15. These people include many people in the banking industry, many Republican
Senators, and Senator Chris Dodd to a certain degree. Prohibiting, supra note 5, at
47 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the S. Banking, Hous. and
Urban Affairs Comm.) (explaining that he did not want to have to go to the senate
floor "begging for a [sixtieth] vote"); Implications of the "Volcker Rules" for
Financial Stability: Hearing on 111 H.R. 4173 Before the S. Banking, Hous. and Urban
Affairs Comm., 111th Cong. 4 (LEXIS) (2010) [hereinafter Implications] (statement
of Barry Zubrow, Executive Vice President and Chief Risk Officer at JPMorgan
Chase).
16. Most banks will be able to comply with the Rule without making significant
adjustments to their capital. See John Carney, Why Wall Street Will Love The 3%
Solution in Reform Bill, CNBC.coM, June 25, 2010,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/37921692; Daniel Indiviglio, Dodd-Frank Bill's Volcker Rule
a Win for Big Banks, THEATLANTIC.COM, June 25, 2010,
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/dodd-frank-bills-volcker-rule-a-
win-for-big-banks/58747 ("The new limit will now give the banks an excuse to reduce
the amount of capital they commit to a hedge fund, which was mostly done to
convince clients that the banks had 'skin in the game."'); see also George
Bollenbacher, Viewpoint: Unresolved Questions on Volcker Rule, AM. BANKER, Oct.
12, 2010 (addressing the uncertainty of the Rule and stating that many banks will still
engage in many speculative activities).
17. R. Christian Bruce, Regulatory Reform: McConnell Predicts Action on Dodd-
Frank, Bachus Urges Global Focus on Volcker Rule, BNA BANKING REP., Nov. 9,
2010 [hereinafter Bruce, Regulatory].
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likely determine the effect of the Rule.18 However, taking a more
inclusive view of the Rule may hurt U.S. banking entities'
competitiveness, may limit banking entities' ability to successfully
manage risks, and may tighten credit.1 9 If the Rule inhibits the
competitiveness of the U.S. financial system, then it "will not serve
[the] goal of [a] strong, stable economy." 20  Thus, to limit
substantial costs to the U.S. financial system, regulators must limit
the reach of the Rule and take into account its shortcomings.
This Note highlights how the Rule does not account for the
primary purpose Paul Volcker envisioned, and concludes that
restricting these activities is not the solution to the problem.
However, through rulemaking, the applicable regulators may be
able to create a workable Rule that limits the unintended
consequences. 21  To support this argument, Part II explores the
recent financial crisis and shows that proprietary trading and
hedge and private equity activities in banking entities played a
small role in the financial crisis.22 Additionally, Part II states the
primary purpose of the Rule, addresses one of the major concerns
regarding the Rule, and gives a brief description of how the Rule
was ultimately passed.23  Part III addresses the unintended
consequences of the Rule on banking entities.24 First, it addresses
hedge and private equity fund activities and shows how the
legislation does not account for the underlying purpose of the
Rule-reducing systemic risk.25  Second, Part III examines the
definition of proprietary trading to show the inherent difficulties in
drafting a workable definition of proprietary trading, illustrating
that an over-inclusive definition of proprietary trading may hurt
18. Aaron Lucchetti & Liz Rappaport, Regulators, Banks Grapple with Volcker
Rule's Reach, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703727804575599430211025438.html.
19. See Letter from Spencer Bachus, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
to Members of Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Nov. 3, 2010), available at
http://op.bna.comlbar.nsf/r?Open=jtin-8avskw [hereinafter Letter from Spencer
Bachus].
20. Implications, supra note 15, at 10 (statement of Barry Zubrow, Executive
Vice President and Chief Risk Officer at JPMorgan Chase).
21. See Gandel, supra note 7.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.B-C.
24. See infra Part III.A-D.
25. See infra Part III.A.
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certain activities of banking entities that reduce systemic risk.26
Third, Part III addresses the Rule's impact on the capital structure
of banking entities.27 Fourth, Part III addresses the potential
competitive disadvantage to the U.S. financial system that the
Rule creates.2 Finally, Part IV addresses the implementation of
the Rule29 and addresses the recent Federal Reserve Board
proposal relating to the conformance period for restricting these
* * 30
activities.
II. PURPOSE OF THE RULE AND ITS ENACTMENT
A. The Financial Crisis
Many proponents of the Rule believe that deregulation of
the banking industry in 1999 was causally related to the financial
crisis." However, lending, a core function of banks, was the most
significant "proximate cause of the financial crisis."32  Banking
entities reported nearly $1.67 trillion in credit losses due to the
financial crisis. It is estimated that nearly eighty percent of the
overall losses during the financial crisis were attributable to
lending and securitization.34 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
estimates that thirty-four percent of cumulative losses by banks
were a result of direct real estate lending, that twenty percent of
the losses incurred were a result of non real estate loans, and
thirty-one percent of the losses incurred were a result of mortgage
backed security holdings.35  These lending and securitization
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part III.C.
28. See infra Part III.D.
29. See infra Part IV.A.
30. See infra Part IV.B.
31. See Arjun Jayadev, Financial Reform in the US: A Brief Overview, ECON. &
POL. WKLY., July 10, 2010.
32. Implications, supra note 15, at 5 (statement of Gerald Corrigan, Managing
Director of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.).
33. Financial Stability: Hearing on 111 H.R. 4173 Before the S. Banking, Hous.
and Urban Affairs Comm., 111th Cong. 4 (LEXIS) (2010) [hereinafter Financial]
(statement of Hal S. Scott, Professor of International Financial Systems, Harvard
Law School).
34. Hal S. Scott, Suggestions for Regulatory Reform: The Reduction of Systemic
Risk in the U.S. Financial System, 33 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 671, 676-77 (2010).
35. Financial, supra note 33, at 4 (statement of Hal S. Scott, Professor of
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practices occurred not only at large national banks, but also at
regional U.S. banks.36 Furthermore, of the nearly $1.67 trillion in
credit losses some estimate that only thirty-three billion, or two
percent of the losses were a result of trading and derivative
activities at banks.37 According to Senator Bob Corker of
Tennessee, "'not a single bank holding company' involved in
proprietary trading was among the companies that collapsed in
2008 and required a government bailout."38  Additionally, short-
term proprietary trading traditionally has only had a nominal
impact on bank profitability.3" From such data, it can be inferred
that proprietary trading and hedge and private equity fund
activities did little to contribute to the financial crisis.4 As a result,
many opponents of the Rule have attacked its necessity and
41
purpose.
B. Primary Purpose of the Rule
The Rule's primary purpose is to be a small piece of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (Dodd-Frank), aimed at alleviating the need to bail out large
banking entities that pose systemic risk to the financial health of
International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School) (discussing the losses incurred
during the financial crisis).
36. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Sewell Chan, Dodd Calls Obama Plan Too Grand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010,
at B1 (stating that a significant portion of the losses attributable to proprietary
trading and hedge and private equity fund activities occurred in non-bank financial
companies such as Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley).
39. Fransesco Guerrera et al., Wall Street to Sidestep 'Volcker Rule,' FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d49fl2e-edO3-lldf-9912-
00144feab49a.html#axzzl9c5lgmz9.
40. See Implications, supra note 15, at 10-11 (statement of Barry Zubrow,
Executive Vice President and Chief Risk Officer at JPMorgan Chase) (stating that it
would be a "misunderstanding" to believe that these activities led to the financial
crisis).
41. See Prohibiting, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd,
Chairman of the S. Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs Comm.) (acknowledging that
many have objected to the Volcker Rule because they claim it would not have
prevented the crisis, or on the grounds that it would have negative implications for
the financial health of the United States).
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the United States.42 It does so by limiting the amount of
speculative, high-risk investments at banking entities.43 Instead, it
encourages banking entities to focus on client activities that are
generally lower-risk.
The Rule, however, was met with staunch opposition for a
number of reasons.45 One of these reasons is the belief, by many,
that the restricted activities are profitable for banking entities and
very important to certain industries.4 6 For example, bank
investments into hedge and private equity funds are very
important to these industries.47 Historically, banks have been
significant investors in private equity and have also represented a
significant source of "direct proprietary involvement" in private
equity funds.48 Some believed that a complete ban on investments
in private equity by banks would deal a potentially devastating
42. Although reducing systemic risk to banking institutions and the financial
system is the primary goal of the Rule, it is also designed to address conflicts of
interest and acknowledge the different cultures in hedge and private equity funds.
For example, hedge and private equity funds rely heavily on their ability to innovate
and trade freely, whereas banking regulation is in large part concerned with risk
management and risk mitigation. See id. at 5-7 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman
of the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board and Former Federal Reserve
Chairman).
43. The key distinction between the types of investments permitted and those
that are not is figuring out for whom the investments are made. Id. at 25 (statement
of Neal S. Wolin, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Treasury).
44. Alerts, Matthew Dyckman et al., SNR Denton LLP, Financial Regulatory
Reform-The Volcker Rule (Sept. 8,2010),
http://www.snrdenton.com/news-insights/alerts/the-volckerrule.aspx [hereinafter
Alerts].
45. Prohibiting, supra note 5, at 5, 7 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of the
President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board and Former Federal Reserve
Chairman) (noting that the key concern was how to define proprietary trading);
Financial, supra note 25, at 5 (statement of Hal S. Scott, Professor of International
Financial Systems, Harvard Law School) (noting that the restrictions on hedge and
private equity fund activities could hurt these industries); Infra Part III.D (discussing
the adverse effects the Rule could have on U.S. global competiveness); see also Joe
Adler & Donna Borak, An Insider's Take, AM. BANKER, March 8, 2010, available at
2010 WLNR 4688533 ("'The notion of a bunch of senators ... trying to write in
statute what proprietary trading is scares me."').
46. See Jayadev, supra note 31.
47. See Financial, supra note 33, at 5-6 (statement of Hal S. Scott, Professor of
International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School).
48. Banks and investment banks account for nearly twelve percent of the
investments in private equity funds. Also, banks have raised nearly $80 billion for
such funds over the past five years. Id. at 5 (statement of Hal S. Scott, Professor of
International Financial Systems at Harvard Law School).
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blow to the already struggling private equity industry, while having
a limited impact on reducing excessive risky behavior.4 9
Restricting a significant capital source for these private equity
funds will further diminish an already shrinking source of financing
for American businesses.o Further, opponents of the Rule suggest
that the benefits of allowing these investments clearly outweigh
the potentially devastating effects that curtailing them may have
on economic recovery." Hedge funds, for example, are very
valuable to our financial markets.52 First, they provide liquidity to
markets during times of stress." Second, by pursuing arbitrage
opportunities they help reduce or eliminate mispricing of financial
assets.54 And third, by taking short positions, they reduce the
excessive enthusiasm of long-only investors."
C. Compromise Leads to Enactment of a "Watered-down"
Volcker Rule
After months of uncertainty, last minute negotiations to
win "Republican support led to a compromise." 6  Wielding
enormous influence, newly elected Senator Scott Brown of
Massachusetts took up the cause of large banks and financial
institutions with significant operations in his state." Brown argued
49. Despite this fact, the total amount of investment in private equity as of
September 30, 2009 "accounted for less than three percent of the aggregate assets of
the six largest banks." Id. at 6 (statement of Hal S. Scott, Professor of International
Financial Systems, Harvard Law School).
50. See Letter from Spencer Bachus, supra note 19.
51. Data shows that hedge fund holdings did not significantly reduce bank risk
profiles. However, it is unclear how much hedge fund capital is derived from banking
entities. See Financial, supra note 33, at 5-6 (statement of Hal S. Scott, Professor of
International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School).
52. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Risk Transfer and Financial Stability, Remarks
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's Forty-first Annual Conference on Bank
Structure (May 5, 2005).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Yalman Onaran, Volcker Said to Be Unhappy With New Version of Rule,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 30, 2010, at 1, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-30/volcker-said-to-be-unhappy-with-
new-version-of-rule.html.
57. Democrats needed one vote to pass Dodd-Frank. Jia Lynn Yang, Scott
Brown's Key Vote Gives Massachusetts Firms Clout in Financial Overhaul,
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that banks should be able to invest at least a small amount of
capital into their own funds," and Democrats needed his vote in
order to pass the financial reform bill. 9 To garner his support,
Congress passed a "watered down" versions of the Rule allowing
certain de minimis investments in hedge and private equity funds.'
III. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND PROBLEMS WITH THE
RULE
A. The Rule's Effect on Hedge and Private Equity Funds
The Rule prohibits banking entities from "sponsoring" 62 or
holding an ownership interest in a hedge or private equity fund.63
Banking entities include "any insured depository institution (as
defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 1813)) [sic], any company that controls an insured
depository institution, or that is treated as a bank holding company
for purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978,
and any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity."" These
"general prohibitions" are subject to several exceptions.65 Banking
entities are allowed to organize and offer a hedge or private equity
fund" if they meet a number of requirements. Moreover, the
WASHINGTON PosT, June, 23, 2010, at A12, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/22/AR2010062205273.html.
58. Id.
59. When asked how he felt about the compromise reached, Paul Volcker stated
that "[s]hock is too strong a word ... [b]ut I was disappointed." John Cassidy, The
Volcker Rule: Obama's Economic Advisor and His Battles Over the Financial-Reform
Bill, THE NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010, at 25.
60. Indiviglio, supra note 16 (stating that the revised version of the Rule passed
was "watered down significantly from its original conception").
61. See Cassidy, supra note 59.
62. A bank can sponsor a fund in three ways: (1) serving as a general partner,
managing member or trust of a fund; (2) selecting or controlling a majority of the
directors, trustees, or management of a fund; and (3) sharing the same name or
variation of that name for business purposes. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 619, § 13(h)(5), 124 Stat. 1376,
1630 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C § 1851).
63. Id. sec. 619, § 13(a)(1).
64. Id. sec. 619, § 13(h)(1).
65. See id. sec. 619, §§ 13(d)(1)(G), 13(d)(4).
66. Organizing and offering a fund includes "serving as a general partner,
2392011]
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Rule allows banking entities to make a de minimis investment in
funds if they do so for the purpose of "establishing the fund and
providing the fund with sufficient initial equity for investment to
permit the fund to attract unaffiliated investors; [ ] or making a de
minimis investment."" The banking entity after one year must
only have a three percent ownership interest in such fund and the
total aggregate investment of the banking entity in hedge and
private equity funds may not exceed three percent of its Tier 1
capital.69 Allowing these small infusions of capital will minimize
the adverse effects on the hedge and private equity funds by
helping new funds get off the ground.o
managing member, or trustee of the fund and in any manner selecting or controlling
(or having employees, officers, directors, or agents who constitute) a majority of the
directors, trustees or management of the fund. Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(G).
67. A banking entity can organize and offer a hedge or private equity fund if: (1)
"the banking entity provides bona fide trust, fiduciary, or investment advisory
services;" (2) "the fund is organized and offered only in connection with the
provision of bona fide trust, fiduciary, or investment advisory services and only to
persons that are customers of such services of the banking entity;" (3) "the banking
entity does not acquire or retain an equity interest, partnership interest, or other
ownership interest in the funds except for a de minimis investment subject to and in
compliance with paragraph (4);" (4) "the banking entity complies with the
restrictions under paragraph (1) and (2) of subparagraph (f);" (5) "the banking entity
does not . . .. guarantee, assume, or otherwise insure obligations or performance of
the hedge fund or private equity fund or of any hedge fund or private equity fund in
which such hedge fund or private equity fund invests;" (6) "the banking entity does
not share with the hedge fund or private equity fund . . . the same name or a variation
of the same name;" (7) "no director or employee of the banking entity takes or
retains an equity interest, partnership interest, or other ownership interest in the
hedge fund or private equity fund, except for any director or employee of the
banking entity who is directly engaged in providing investment advisory or other
services to the hedge fund or private equity fund;" and (8) "the banking entity
discloses to prospective and actual investors in the fund, in writing, that any losses in
such hedge fund or private equity fund are borne solely by the investors and not by
the banking entity . . . ." Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(G) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1851).
68. A banking entity that makes such an investment must seek investors
unaffiliated with the banking entity to reduce the banks investment. After one year,
the amount of ownership in any such fund may not exceed three percent, and the
aggregate ownership interest in all such funds may not exceed three percent of the
Tier 1 capital of the bank. Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(4).
69. Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(4)(B)(ii).
70. Allowing this "seed money" will provide a source of initial capital for new
funds. See Financial, supra note 33, at 6 (statement of Hal S. Scott, Professor of
International Financial Systems at Harvard Law School).
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The de minimis exception, however, may provide a benefit
for some banking entities." The three percent investment
limitation in any hedge or private equity fund will give banking
entities the excuse to limit the amount of capital they invest in
each fund--called putting "skin in the game." Banks put "skin in
the game" in order to convince clients that the fund is a good
investment. Now, banks will be able to "stop the arms race" at
three percent, and customers will not be able to demand a larger
commitment.74
However, reducing the amount of capital banks can legally
put into hedge and private equity funds will hurt these funds,
especially funds that rely extensively on their significant
connections with banking entities. One reason that investors
favor these funds is due to the fact that banks put significant
capital into these funds. These funds rely not only on the bank's
capital, but also on the network that the bank provides for them.
In-house funds may inevitably see their "investment thesis"
change dramatically because outside investors may be unwilling to
invest in these funds without the significant commitment from
banks and the network that they provide. In turn, success of
these funds may be irreparably damaged. 79 Thus, the Rule takes
away a significant type of investor for hedge and private equity
funds, and for funds that rely in large part on banking entities, the
Rule may be a death sentence.
Another major concern relating to the restrictions on hedge
and private equity fund activities is the definition of such funds.
71. Carney, supra note 16; Indiviglio, supra note 16.
72. See Carney, supra note 16.
73. See id.
74. Previously, banks had been forced to commit more and more funds to the
hedge funds to compete with other funds. Indiviglio, supra note 16.
75. See Nicholas Donato & Toby Mitchennall, Regulation Gold Rush?,
PRIVATEEQUITYONLINE.COM, Sept. 6, 2010.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Id.
80. Cf id. (stating that the "'investment thesis of the[se] [have] radically
changed,"' if the bank decides to spin off its commitment in in-house funds).
81. Malini Manickavasagam, Regulatory Reform: SIMFA Warns of Legal
Uncertainty in Volcker Rule's Fund Restrictions, BNA BANKING REP., Nov. 16, 2010.
2412011]
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Uncertainty has ensued due to congressional reliance on
82definitions in the 1940 Investment Company Act (Act). Under
the Rule, funds that are not required to register under the Act
pursuant to section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) are considered hedge or
private equity funds."3 However, there are investments vehicles
and corporate structures that rely on such exclusions that are not
hedge or private equity funds and share little, if any, characteristics
with these types of funds.Y Relying on this broad definition could
go beyond the scope of the intended target of the Rule-hedge
and private equity funds.8 As a result, the American Bankers
Association proposed that the Financial Stability Oversight
Council identify the inherent characteristics of hedge and private
equity funds and remove companies that do not exhibit these
characteristics from the ambit of the Rule.
For example, Canadian banks operating in the United
States have expressed concern that Canadian Public Funds that are
not registered under the Act may be subject to the restrictions.87
These banks are subject to the Rule's restrictions because they
operate in the United States." A literal reading of the Rule would
82. Letter from Lisa J. Bleier, Vice President and Senior Counsel, Am. Bankers
Ass'n to Alastair Fitzpayne, Deputy Chief of Staff and Executive Sec'y, Dep't of
Treasury (Nov. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from Lisa J. Bleier] (on file at
www.regulations.gov). The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as
well as the Private Equity Growth Capital Council and Managed Funds Association
have voiced concerns over which funds would be considered hedge and private equity
funds. Manickavasagam, supra note 81.
83. Letter from Lisa J. Bleier, supra note 82.
84. For example, "[e]ntities that are commonly utilized by banking entities to
facilitate permissible activities include acquisition vehicles or joint ventures relating
to a single underlying investment, finance subsidiaries, credit funds, employee
pension funds, bank-owned life insurance policies, [and] foreign funds regulated
under the laws of other countries" would be considered hedge or private equity
funds. Id.
85. Id.; see also Manickavasagam, supra note 81 (stating that Representative
Frank believes that the definition of hedge and private equity funds should not be
"overdone" and that they do not want there to be excessive regulation).
86. Letter from Lisa J. Bleier, supra note 82.
87. Letter from Barbara Muir, Vice-President & Deputy Gen. Counsel, Bank of
Montreal, to the Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Nov. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Letter
from Barbara Muir] (on file at www.regulations.gov).
88. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, sec. 619, § 13(h)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1629 (2010) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C § 1851). Banking entities include "any non-US bank (and any parent
company) that has a US branch, agency, commercial lending company or insured
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impose restrictions "'extraterritorially' on Canada and other
foreign jurisdictions" even though they have local statutes
comparable to the Act, while U.S. Public Funds are registered
under the Act and thus are not treated as hedge or private equity
funds."9 Regulating these public funds is not supported by the
goals of the Rule.? The majority of the investors in such funds are
Canadian citizens, and as a result, these funds "have little impact
on the U.S. financial markets."9' Treating such funds as hedge and
private equity funds would require these foreign banks to divest
their ownership interests in funds organized and regulated by the
laws of their country, even though they have little impact on the
financial health of the United States. 9 Due to this illogical result,
foreign banks expressed their concerns regarding the Rule and
proposed that regulations need to exempt such public foreign
funds from the definition of hedge and private equity funds.93
The venture capital industry has voiced similar concerns. 94
Venture capital firms serve many important functions to the U.S
economy: they promote technological innovation, create high
quality jobs, and promote economic growth in vitally important
industries.95 Additionally, banks that do invest in these funds
depository institution subsidiary." MAYER BROWN LLP, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW
FINANCIAL REFORM LEGISLATION: THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 64 (2010),
http://www.mayerbrown.com/dodd-frankact/article.asp?id=9360&nid=13007.
89. Letter from Barbara Muir, supra note 87.
90. Cf Prohibiting, supra note 5, at 8 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of
the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board and Former Federal Reserve
Chairman) (stating that in order to address the underlying causes of the financial
crisis the Volcker Rule addresses a number of factors that includes reducing the
ability of banking entities that engage in risky activities to use social mechanisms such
as FDIC insurance).
91. Letter from Barbara Muir, supra note 87 (stating also that U.S. affiliates of
Canadian banks do not have exposure to Canadian funds and also that Canadian
funds cannot assert claims for federal subsidies such as FDIC insurance in the United
States).
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Letter from Mark G. Heesen, President, National Venture Capital Ass'n, to
Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from Mark G.
Heesen] (on file at www.regulations.gov).
95. Id. (stating that the venture capital industry promotes economic growth in
industries such as software, biotechnology, medical devices and clean technology, and
these companies account for twelve million jobs and twenty-one percent of U.S.
GDP).
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provide meaningful benefits to their clients and to the sector, and
the banks that do so are already subject to regulatory exams to
make sure these activities do not present risks to the insured
depository institution." These investments, however, usually do
not create "systemic risk" to banking entities or the financial
system and do not cause the harms the Rule is intended to
address.7 Because these investments do not pose "safety and
soundness concerns," the industry urges that the regulatory
agencies either exempt these funds from the definition of hedge
and private equity funds or use their discretion to treat these
activities as those that "promote and protect the financial stability
of our country," pursuant to section 619(d)(1)(J).98 A failure to
exempt these funds will decrease capital to a vitally important
industry resulting in undesirable consequences that will hurt the
financial health and competiveness of the United States."
B. Problems with Definition of Proprietary Trading
A literal reading of the Rule may lead one to come to the
conclusion that the definition of proprietary trading is
"watertight."1a Proprietary trading is defined as
engaging as a principal for the trading account of
the banking entity or nonbank financial company
supervised by the [Federal Reserve] Board in any
transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire
or dispose of, any security, derivative, any contract
of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any
96. Id.
97. Senator Chris Dodd made remarks on the senate floor that venture capital
investments do not present the same types of harm that the Rule is intended to curb.
Letter from E. William Parsley III, Treasurer and Chief Inv. Officer, The PNC Fin.
Servs. Group, to the Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Nov. 5, 2010) [hereinafter
Letter from E. William Parsley III] (on file at www.regulations.gov).
98. Letter from Mark G. Heesen, supra note 94.
99. Countries worldwide are already attempting to draw in capital and talent
from this industry in the U.S. "Artificially" restricting capital flows into this small
but critical industry is not the best way to address this problem. See id.
100. Antony Currie, Volcker Rule Won't so Quickly Squelch House Bets, REUTERS
BLOG, (Aug. 5, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/columns/2010/08/05/volcker-
rule-wont-so-quickly-squelch-house-bets.
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option on any such security, derivative, or contract,
or any security or financial instrument that the
appropriate Federal banking agencies, the [SEC],
and the Commodity and Futures Trading
commission may, by rule as provided in section
(b)(2), determine."o'
The term trading account is defined as
any account used for acquiring or taking positions in
securities or instruments . . . principally for the
purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise
with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-
term price movements), and any such other
accounts as the appropriate Federal banking
agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
may, by rule as provided ... determine.102
However, when one analyzes these two statutory
definitions of proprietary trading in tandem, it is clear that
proprietary trading may be difficult to pinpoint.'xo According to
the legislation, proprietary trading only accounts for trading in the
''near term" or trades that involve "short-term price movement."
Determining what constitutes a trade in the "near term," even if
strictly defined by regulation, may prove to be futile.0 o Although
Paul Volcker stated that every banker knows what proprietary
trading is, there is a certain amount of gray area, and even if
regulators are able to define trading in the near term as holding on
101. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 619, § 13(h)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1630 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C §
1851).
102. Id. sec. 619, § 13(h)(6).
103. Memorandum by Brian D. Christensen & William J. Sweet Jr., Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, The Volcker Rule (July 9, 2010),
http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentlD=51&itemlD=2128.
104. Id.
105. See Antony Currie & Christopher Swann, The Uncertainties of the Volcker
Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at B2, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/business/06views.html.
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to a security for less than two weeks, traders will be able to find
new and inventive ways around such restrictions.'0 For instance,
bankers may be able to create a financial swap that offsets the time
restriction, allowing the bank to buy back the security at a future
date. 7 In the meantime, however, there is a lot of uncertainty
about which trades will be covered and which will not.1os Due to
this uncertainty, the success of the Rule will rely heavily on
regulators.1 09
This vague language may also allow banks to make minimal
adjustments to their proprietary trading groups in order to comply
with the Rule.o They can do this is in one of two ways: (1) by
altering the timing of trades; or (2) by altering the participant in
the trade."' First, they may be able to continue to engage in
proprietary trading by making the trades on an agency basis, by
buying and selling securities for their customers and not for their
own account.H2 Alternatively, "by extending the time frame of the
trade" a bank may be able to engage in current trading activities
on a principal basis, by directly trading for the bank.'13  These
"principal investments," which are characterized by longer-term
commitments and higher capital charges, were important to banks'
profits during the financial crisis but were also responsible for
large losses.114 Banking entities, nevertheless, plan to continue
such investments." Neither of these potential loopholes
exemplifies the "hard legislative proscription" that Volcker
106. Interview by Erik Schatzker with Robert Wosnitzer, Professor at New York
University, BLOOMBERG Tv (Nov. 9, 2010).
107. Id.
108. See Currie & Swann, supra note 105.
109. See Cassidy, supra note 59.
110. Alerts, supra note 44.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(D), 124 Stat. 1376, 1624 (2010) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1851) (stating that trading transactions on behalf of customers are explicitly
allowed).
113. Alerts, supra note 44.
114. Guerrera et al., supra note 39.
115. Id. (stating that Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley plan
to continue making direct investments).
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envisioned, and both would allow banks to engage in alleged
speculative activity.116
Furthermore, the Rule allows banking entities to engage in
a number of permitted activities, two of which are "market
making" and "risk mitigated hedging."1 17  These permitted
activities are considered vital to banking entities. but are often
hard to differentiate from proprietary trading.19 For instance, it
will be difficult for regulators to distinguish between market
making and proprietary trading.120 According to the SEC, market
makers are "firm[s] that stand ready to buy and sell a particular
stock on a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted
price." 121 Market making is a requisite activity of "well-managed
and well-supervised bank[s]." 22 Banking entities engage in market
making for two reasons: to provide market liquidity and to
123facilitate trading in certain securities. Proponents of the Rule
believe that it will be challenging to differentiate between the two
activities, but it is possible. 24 On the other hand, opponents
believe that it is an impossible task.'25 The task of delving into this
116. See Prohibiting, supra note 5, at 15-16 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman
of the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board and Former Federal Reserve
Chairman) (stating that the new rule should have legislative proscriptions rather than
a loose voluntary provision); Guerrera et al., supra note 31 ("Simon Johnson,
professor at [MIT], said it would be 'pretty crazy' if banks were allowed to invest as a
principal in longer-maturing assets and securities. 'That's exactly how banks blew
themselves up."').
117. The Rule also allows trading activities in government securities, on behalf of
customers, by an insurance business on behalf of the insurance company, investments
in small business investment companies, the public welfare, and qualified
rehabilitation expenditures, and any additional activities that the Regulators
determine promote the safety and soundness of the U.S. financial stability. Dodd-
Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(d)(1) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C § 1851).
118. Letter from E. William Parsley III, supra note 97.
119. Mike Ferullo, Drawing a Line Between Proprietary Trading, Market Making a
Challenge for Regulators, BNA BANKING REPORT, Nov. 30, 2010.
120. See Memorandum from Thomas M. Hoenig, President of the Fed. Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, Comments on the Volcker Rule Activity Restrictions (Mar. 2,
2010) [hereinafter Memorandum from Thomas H. Hoenig] (on file with the Kansas
City Federal Reserve).
121. Market Maker, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM. (Mar. 17, 2000),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mktmaker.htm.
122. Implications, supra note 15, at 5 (statement of Gerald Corrigan, Managing
Director of Goldman Sachs).
123. Ferullo, supra note 119.
124. See id.
125. Hal S. Scott, Professor of International Financial Systems at Harvard Law
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"gray area" is left to the applicable regulatory agencies, 126 and an
improper definition of market making or proprietary trading could
reduce the safety and soundness of banking institutions and
restrict the availability and cost of credit.'
These regulatory agencies face challenges due to the
similarities between the two activities."8 First, market making may
encompass trading in the "near term"129 as does the prohibition in
the Rule.130 Second, banking entities have used the same trading
desk for both types of activities.'3  Third, banking entities profit
from both market making activities and proprietary trading, and
banking entities also use their own capital to fund such
operations. 32 Further, some speculators sometimes have
customers, making them look like market makers, and market
makers sometimes become speculators.133 On the other hand,
market making does not contain the element of "trading as a
principal" for the bank or banking entity.134 Although this seems
School, stated that he does not believe it is possible to differentiate between
proprietary trading and market making. "[He] thinks that we have to give people lie
detectors or something." Id. Even regulators believe that it is not easy to tell the
difference and some instruments may be of "dual purpose." R. Christian Bruce,
GOP-Controlled House May Shape Rulewriting Under Dodd-Frank Act, BNA
BANKING REPORT, Nov. 9, 2010 [hereinafter Bruce, GOP].
126. See Ferullo, supra note 119.
127. Implications, supra note 15, at 11-12 (statement of Barry Zubrow, Executive
Vice President and Chief Risk Officer at JPMorgan Chase).
128. See Ferullo, supra note 119.
129. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 619, § 13(h)(6), 124 Stat. 1376, 1630 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C §
1851).
130. Compare Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(h)(4) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C §
1851) (stating that proprietary trading is trading is "engaging as a principal for the
trading account of a banking entity"), and id. sec. 619, § 13(h)(6) ("The term 'trading
account' means any account used for acquiring or taking positions securities and
instruments described in paragraph (4) principally for the purpose of selling in the
near term . . . "), with Market Maker, supra note 121 (stating that market makers
stand ready to buy and sell a particularly stock on a regular and continuous basis).
131. Ferullo, supra note 119.
132. See William L. Silber, On the Nature of Trading: Do Speculators Leave
Footprints?, 29 J. PORTFOLIO MGmT. 64, 65 (2003).
133. Id. at 64.
134. Compare Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(h)(4) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C §
1851) (stating that proprietary trading is "engaging as principal for the trading
account of a banking entity"), with Market Maker, supra note 121 ("A 'market
maker' is a firm that stands ready to buy and sell a particular stock on a regular and
continuous basis at a publicly quoted price.").
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straightforward, it is actually very difficult to tell if a bank is
trading for its own purposes or for its customers, and many
skeptics of the Rule were wary of such a definition.' Senator Jeff
Merkley and Senator Carl Levin suggest that regulations seeking
to distinguish between the two will "require routine data from
banks on the volume of trading being conducted, the size of
accumulated positions, the length of time positions remain open,
average bid-ask spreads, and the volatility of profits and loss ...
."136 However, determinations based on quantitative data may
result in an arbitrary cut-off line between legitimate market
making and proprietary trading.' There is further difficulty
because the timing of market making positions could vary greatly
depending on the type of financial instrument and market
conditions."' As a result, such line drawing may be overly broad,
including legitimate market making activities that banks have
engaged in for many years, or on the other hand, under-inclusive,
whereby it does not include the type of trading the Rule sought to
ban.139 This difficulty may allow banks to hide their proprietary
trading by making these trading activities resemble market
making.140 On the other hand, an attempt to limit banking entities'
ability to hide proprietary trading in these activities may severely
135. Implications, supra note 15, at 12 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd,
Chairman of the S. Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs Comm.) (stating that an
individual in the banking industry told him that "[he] can find a way to say that
virtually any trade we make is somehow related to serving one of our clients. They
can go ahead and impose the rule on Friday and I can assure you that by Monday
we'll find a way around it.").
136. See Memorandum from Scott Cammarn et al., Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft LLP, An Analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act's Volcker Rule, to Clients & Friends 7
(Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.cadwalader.com/search-results.php?search=volcker+rule
[hereinafter Memorandum from Scott Cammarn] (quoting the two Senators in an
August 3rd letter to the banking agency head). They also propose in their comments
to the Financial Stability Oversight Council that regulators should key in on timings
of the trades since focusing on the intent of traders can be time consuming and
subjective. Letter from Sen. Merkley et al., to the Fin. Stability Oversight Council
(Nov. 4, 2010) (on file at www.regulations.gov).
137. See Memorandum from Scott Cammarn, supra note 136, at 7.
138. See Letter from Carolyn Walsh, Deputy Gen. Counsel, ABA Sec. Ass'n, to
Alistair Fitzpayne, Deputy Chief of Staff & Exec. Sec'y, Dep't of the Treasury (Nov.
4, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from Carolyn Walsh] (on file at www.regulations.gov).
139. See id.
140. Memorandum from Thomas H. Hoenig, supra note 120.
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limit their ability to serve customers and facilitate markets, hurting
the financial health of the United States.141
Concerns have also been raised as to what will constitute
"risk mitigating hedging activities."' 42 Exclusion of these activities
is critical to banking entities since they allow them to effectively
manage risk. 143 To mitigate risks, banking entities often take
derivative positions.'" Proponents of a strong Rule suggest that
banking entities must be prohibited from buying a "variant" of the
same derivative from another financial firm in an effort to hedge
some of their risky financial derivatives. 145  Even though these
comments have their merits, regulators must also take into account
the fact that each banking entity's business model and risk
exposure is different.146 Further, trades that are looked at in
"isolation" may resemble proprietary trading; however, the trade
may be "part of a mosaic of serving clients and properly managing
the firm's risks."147 Although delineating a line between permitted
hedging activities and speculative activities will be very difficult to
do, an overreaching Rule that restricts activities that are important
to banks may increase systemic risk by hurting the ability of
banking entities to manage risks on their balance sheets.'4
141. Cf Letter from Carolyn Walsh, supra note 129 (stating that there should be a
process whereby the Federal Reserve is able to exempt certain activities so they can
promptly address any unintended application of the Rule, which could affect the
"orderly functioning of the markets").
142. See Letter from E. William Parsley III, supra note 97; Public Input for the
Study Regarding the Implementation of the Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and
Certain Relationships With Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 75 Fed. Reg.
61,758, 61,759 (Oct. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Public Input] (requesting comments
concerning "risk mitigating hedging activities").
143. See Letter from E. William Parsley III, supra note 97.
144. Cf id. (stating that banks take risks in everything they do).
145. Letter from Lynn A. Stout, Paul Hastings Professor of Corporate and
Securities Law, UCLA School of Law, to Members of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from Lynn A. Stout] (on file at
www.regulations.gov).
146. See Letter from E. William Parsley III, supra note 97.
147. Implications, supra note 15, at 11 (statement of Barry Zubrow, Executive
Vice President and Chief Risk Officer at JPMorgan Chase).
148. Letter from E. William Parsley III, supra note 97; see also Implications, supra
note 15, at 12 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the S. Banking,
Hous. and Urban Affairs Comm.) ("While numerical limits and strict rules may
sound simple, there is great potential that they would undermine the goals of
economic stability, growth and job creation.").
C. Impact on Capital Structure of Banking Entities
Most large banks will be able to comply with the
proprietary trading restriction without making significant changes
to their capital structures.149 For most banking entities, the amount
of proprietary trading "is too negligible" to significantly affect
them.so Nevertheless, firms such as Citigroup,"' Goldman Sachs,
and JPMorgan Chase have already shed some of their proprietary
trading groups.52 The Rule will likely only drastically affect
Goldman Sachs, which derives ten percent of its revenues from
proprietary trading."' Proprietary trading, however, may be a
source of diversification, mitigating risk rather than increasing it.15 4
Firms that had significant trading operations fared better than
those that had highly concentrated exposure to certain assets.155
Because the Rule will only have a nominal impact on banking
entities' capital structure, but may result in less diversification and
increased risk, the benefits of allowing such activities may
156
outweigh the nominal gains from constricting these activities.
Additionally, most banking entities will have plenty of time
to comply and will be able to gradually spin off their hedge and
private equity funds that do not comply with the Rule. In fact,
most banks could very well hold onto their in-house hedge and
private equity funds.5 Some individuals in the financial industry
believe that some firms will do more trading in-house, rather than
149. See Carney, supra note 16.
150. Financial, supra note 33, at 4 (2010) (statement of Hal S. Scott, Professor of
International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School).
151. See Megan Davies & Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Volcker Impact Sends Shivers
Through Banks, REUTERS, Aug. 9, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLNE67800N20100809.
152. See Letter from Spencer Bachus, supra note 19.
153. See Indiviglio, supra note 16.
154. Financial, supra note 33, at 5 (statement of Hal S. Scott, Professor of
International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School).
155. Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanly and JP Morgan all had significant trading
operations and survived the financial crisis. On the other hand, firms with
concentrated exposures in real estate such as Lehman Brother failed. Id.
156. See id.
157. See Carney, supra note 16; Donato & Mitchenhall, supra note 75 (stating that
most banks may not have to fully comply with the rules for 10-12 years).
158. Banks would be able to do this but would need to hold smaller shares in the
private equity group. See Cassidy, supra note 59.
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investing in established hedge and private equity funds that would
be open to outside investors.15 9 If true, this practice would make
risk "less diversified and more concentrated," which in effect
would increase the risk profiles of these banks and their
vulnerability to shocks in the financial system. 160 However, banks
must seek "unaffiliated investors" 161 to these funds, and this
provision ameliorates the concern that these funds would not be
open to outside investors.162
D. Global Competiveness
During congressional hearings, supporters and critics alike
voiced concerns that enacting the provisions of the Rule
unilaterally would hurt U.S. competiveness.1' To date, the
restricted activities are permitted everywhere else in the world.'6
This "go it alone" approach was not the outcome desired by Paul
Volcker and supporters of the Rule.16 ' An inflexible
implementation of the Rule could result in "regulatory
arbitrage,"'6 pushing customer activity to non-regulated entities in
159. See Indiviglio, supra note 16.
160. See id.
161. Unaffiliated investor is an undefined term and will need further rulemaking
to determine who constitutes an unaffiliated investor. Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 619, §
13(d)(4)(B)(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1627 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C § 1851).
162. See id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(G).
163. See Prohibiting, supra note 5, at 11 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of
the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board and Former Federal Reserve
Chairman) (stating that the U.S. could go it alone, but it is not the "desired
outcome"). Representative Bachus originally put forth a proposal conditioning the
acceptance of the Rule on condition that the majority of the G-20 countries
implemented it. Letter from Spencer Bachus, supra note 19.
164. Letter from Spencer Bachus, supra note 19 (stating that EU countries have
rejected the Rule and have no plans to adopt it); see also Andrew Clark, Myners: UK
Does Not Need to Copy Obama Banking Reforms," GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2010, 2:51
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jan/22/uk-considers-barack-obama-
style-banking-reform/print (stating that the UK does not intend to copy the Volcker
Rule legislation).
165. See Prohibiting, supra note 5, at 11 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of
the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board and Former Federal Reserve
Chairman); Id. at 31 (statement of Neal S. Wolin, Deputy Secretary, Department of
Treasury) ("I think we are working closely with our G-20 partners to make sure that
we get a regime that works worldwide so that we don't have new opportunities for
arbitrage.").
166. See Chris Skinner, How the Dodd-Frank Legislation Impacts Capital Markets,
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the United States or to foreign financial companies not subject to
U.S. regulation.167 The major concern is that making U.S. firms
divest these business activities could result in capital and talent
flowing overseas to foreign firms not regulated by the Rule.'6
Another potential consequence of the Rule is that it could restrict
U.S. banking entities' ability to manage risk and diversify their
portfolios since trading and fee income derived from a diverse set
of financial products and services can make banking entities less
risky and more stable.169  As a result, U.S. banking entities in
comparison to their foreign counterparts may be significantly
limited in their ability to manage risks. 70 If federal regulators do
not take into account these negative consequences, the
competitive disadvantage to the U.S. financial system may
*171
eviscerate any gains from restricting these activities.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULE
A. Rulemaking and Implementation
Despite significant uncertainty, banking regulators are
dealt the daunting task of determining the ultimate effect of the
Rule on banking entities.172 On October 6, 2010, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (the FSOC) sent out a request for
information on the Rule. 73 Comments to the Rule obtained by
FIN. SERVICES CLUB BLOG (Aug. 2,2010,8:30 AM),
http://thefinanser.co.uk/fsclub/2010/08/how-the-doddfrank-legislation-impacts-
capital-markets.html (defining regulatory arbitrage as instances where a restrictive
business environment may cause firms to move activities to less restrictive markets).
167. Manickavasagam, supra note 81; Letter from E. William Parsley III, supra
note 97.
168. Firms such as Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan have already shed their prop
trading units. Letter from Spencer Bachus, supra note 19.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. (recommending that the FSOC study of the Rule "take account of how
trading activities fit into the global core business plan of banks, as well as the
consequences for U.S. banks and banks' clients of prohibiting [these] activities in the
U.S. while they continue to be permitted everywhere else in the world").
172. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, sec. 619, § 13(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1621-22 (2010) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C § 1851).
173. Public Input, supra note 142, at 61,758.
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this information request will guide the FSOC study submitted on
January 21, 2011.174 The federal banking agencies, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission are required to consider these findings when
promulgating regulations carrying out the Rule.'
During the comment process (which ended on November 5,
2010),76 proponents and critics of the Rule voiced their concerns
relating to the Rule's implementation.17 The major concerns
relate to market making and legitimate hedging activities and how
they will be defined, the definition of hedge and private equity
178funds, and the effect the Rule will have on U.S. competitiveness.
Some proponents of the Rule believe that the regulatory agencies
should implement a strong Rule, focusing on the intent of
Congress. Supporters of the Rule, however, understand that
implementation of the Rule needs to avoid "unintended and
undesirable consequences."1so Even though the goals of the Rule
are desirable,'8 ' strong implementation of the Rule that does not
account for unintended consequences will likely have the opposite
effect, increasing risk to the U.S. financial system.
174. FSOC is required to submit a study and make recommendations on the
implementations of the Rule no later than six months after enactment (Dodd-Frank
was enacted on June 21, 2010). Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(b)(1), (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C § 1851).
175. Id. sec. 619, § 13(b)(2).
176. Public Input, supra note 142, at 61,758.
177. Compare Letter from Paul A. Volcker, supra note 14 (stating that
implementation of the Rule should focus on the intent of the Rule and should be a
strong prohibition against the restricted activities), with Letter from Spencer Bachus,
supra note 19 (stating that the Rule has many unintended consequences and may hurt
U.S. banking entities competiveness internationally).
178. See discussion supra Parts III.A-C.
179. E.g., Letter from Michael Greenberg, Professor, University of Md. School of
Law, to Timothy Geithner, Chairman of Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Nov. 5,
2010) (on file at www.regulations.gov); see also Letter from S. Merkley et al., to
Members of Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Oct. 28, 2010) (on file at
www.regulations.gov) (recommending a two-tiered, cooperative regulatory structure,
whereby regulators conduct real-time monitoring and enforcement and regulators
review firms' policies and procedures and conduct in-depth portfolio examinations).
180. See Letter from E. William Parsley III, supra note 97.
181. See Letter from Lynn A. Stout, supra note 145 (stating that the goals of the
Rule are reducing systemic risk in the U.S. financial system by reducing risky
activities in banking entities).
182. See Letter from Spencer Bachus, supra note 19.
2011] VOLCKER RULE 255
B. Conformance with the Rule and the Fed's Proposed Rule
The Rule allows banking entities two years to comply with
the restrictions after the prohibitions take effect, which is the
earlier of July 21, 2012, or twelve months after issuance of the final
regulations.' The Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) is granted
authority to extend this two-year period for one year at a time if,
in its judgment, the extension is "consistent with the purposes of
this section and would not be detrimental to the public interest."'8
Any banking entity meeting the guidelines of the Fed is eligible for
up to three one-year extensions.18' The conformance period is
intended to avoid market disruption and give banking entities time
to adjust to the provisions of the Rule.186
The Fed's proposed rule implements the provisions of the
Rule granting banking entities two years to comply with Rule's
restrictions once it takes effect, but a banking entity can request
additional extensions." Under the proposed rule, a banking entity
that seeks an extension must submit a request to the Board.'88 In
making its determination, the Fed will consider, among other
things,189 market conditions, "the nature of the trading activit[ies]
or investment[s]," the level of risk, and whether the investment
involves "material conflicts between the banking entity and its
183. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 619, § 13(c)(1) 124 Stat. 1376, 1622 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C §
1851). All of these permitted activities, however, are not allowed if they result in
"material conflicts of interest," expose the bank to high-risk assets or trading
strategies, pose a threat to "safety and soundness" of the bank, or threaten the
financial stability of the U.S. See id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(2).
184. The Fed is granted sole authority to make Rules determining the
conformance period. Id. sec. 619, § 13(c)(2).
185. Id.
186. Conformance Period for Entities Engaged in Prohibited Proprietary Trading
or Private Equity or Hedge Fund Activities, 75 Fed. Reg. 72,741, 72,742 (proposed
Nov. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Conformance] (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
187. Id. at 72,743.
188. Id. ("Any such request for an extension must: (1) Be submitted in writing to
the Board at least 90 days prior to the expiration of the applicable time period; (2)
provide the reasons why the banking entity believes the extension should be granted;
and (3) provide a detailed explanation of the banking entity's plan for divesting or
conforming the activity or investment(s).").
189. Id. ("These factors are not exclusive, and under the proposal, the Board
retains the ability to consider other factors or considerations that it deems
appropriate.").
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customer or counterparties."'9 Also, under the proposed rule, the
Fed may impose additional conditions on any extensions "if the
Board determines such conditions are necessary or appropriate to
protect the safety and soundness of banking entities or the
financial stability of the United States, address material conflicts of
interest or other unsound practices, or otherwise further the
purposes of section 13 of the BHC Act and the other proposed
Rules."'91 It further provides that if a nonbank financial company
becomes a banking entity after July 21, 2010, then the resulting
banking entity must come into compliance with the restrictions of
the Rule at the later of: (1) the date the prohibitions of the Rule
become effective with respect to banking entities before July 21,
2010; or (2) two years after the nonbank financial company
becomes a banking entity.'" "Illiquid Funds,"'93 on the other hand,
are given additional time to comply with the Rule and are allowed
to request an additional extension of up to five years to meet a
contractual obligation in place before May 1, 2010.194 However,
the Private Equity Growth Capital Council has urged the FSOC to
grant additional time once a rule is in place because banking
entities selling off investments in some funds before the end of
their investment terms could lead to significant market
disruption.'95
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Conformance, 75 Fed. Reg. 72,741, 72,742-43 (proposed Nov. 26, 2010) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
193. The Proposed Rule defines an "illiquid asset" as any asset that is not a "liquid
asset." The proposed liquid assets "are designed to capture the wide range of
instruments and assets (or their equivalents) that one actively and routinely trades on
markets or trading facilities, as for which bid offer or price quotations are widely
available." Also, the Fed retains discretion to include other assets that may be
considered liquid, but are not included in the definition. A fund is illiquid if it is
"principally invest" in illiquid assets. To be principally invested, "75 percent of the
fund's consolidated assets are, or are expected to be, comprised of illiquid assets or
risk-mitigated hedges entered into in connection with, and related to, individual or
aggregated positions in, or holdings of, illiquid assets." Id. at 72,744-45.
194. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 619, § 13(c)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1623 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C §
1851).
195. Many of the private equity funds formed before the enactment of the Rule
terminate in 2022 or 2023. Manickavasagam, supra note 81.
[Vol. 15256
VOLCKER RULE
Because the proposed rule gives ample time for banking
entities to conform to the Rule's restrictions, it will help avoid
disruption to the financial stability of the United States in the near
term. 96 It also increases the possibility that Congress will have
time to get rid of portions of the provision or the provision in its
entirety.'" In fact, Republicans intend to put Dodd-Frank "under
the microscope," and the Rule is at the top of their list.' 99
Rethinking Dodd-Frank carries huge implications and could result
in new congressional debate regarding the costs and benefits of the
Rule.200 Although "wholesale" repeal of Dodd-Frank is not on
Congress' agenda in the near future, congressional debate on the
topic may influence regulators enacting the Rule to minimize the
potential negative consequences. 20 1 Further, those in Congress
have not ruled out statutory changes.202
V. CONCLUSION
Increasing the safety and soundness of banking entities and
the U.S. financial system is an important goal.203  The Rule,
however, imposes substantial costs on U.S. financial stability while
doing little to account for this goal.204 Focusing on activities that
were not a significant contributor to the financial crisis is not only
nonsensical in light of some of their benefits but may pose threats
to the financial system that are greater than the benefits of
196. See Conformance, 75 Fed. Reg. 72, 741, 72, 742 (proposed Nov. 26, 2010) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
197. See Bruce, Regulatory, supra note 17; Letter from E. William Parsley III,
supra note 97 (stating that he does not believe that investing in private funds
represents undue risks to banks).
198. Bruce, Regulatory, supra note 17.
199. See id.
200. Because many believe that the Rule is not a necessary portion of financial
reform and results in many unintended consequences, there is the prospect that
portions of the Rule may be changed in whole or part. See id.
201. Id.; see also Bruce, GOP, supra note 125 ("[t]he 2010 midterms will make the
rulemaking climate easier for regulators, and more user-friendly for bankers.").
202. See Bruce, GOP, supra note 125.
203. See Prohibiting, supra note 5, at 24 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of
the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board and Former Federal Reserve
Chairman).
204. Bruce, Regulatory, supra note 17.
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restricting such activities. Nonetheless, regulators can mitigate
the adverse effects of the Rule by crafting regulations that allow
activities that are beneficial to industries adversely affected by the
Rule, to banking entities, and to the financial well being of the
United States in its entirety.20 Although repeal of the Rule is
unlikely at this juncture,207 a failure by regulators to account for the
shortcomings of the Rule may provoke Congress to reevaluate the
costs and benefits of the Rule, and the long conformance period
increases the probability that there will be statutory changes.m
RYAN K. BRISSETTE
205. See Implications, supra note 15, at 10 (statement of Barry Zubrow, Executive
Vice President and Chief Risk Officer at JPMorgan Chase) (stating that it would be a
"misunderstanding" to believe that these activities led to the financial crisis); Letter
from Spencer Bachus, supra note 19 (stating that regulators need to take into account
the potential devastating effect the Rule may have on U.S competiveness).
206. See Bruce, Regulatory, supra note 17; Letter from Lisa J. Bleier, supra note
82.
207. Bruce, GOP, supra note 125.
208. Even though the main focus in Congress will be regulatory action, many
believe that there could be changes on the way, and as costs of compliance are
coming into focus, the regulations costs could move Congress to mitigate the impact
on the financial industry. See id.
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